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Abstract: Despite the media attention lavished on short-termism, the UK perspective has not 
enjoyed any sustained examination of the sort Professor Mark Roe has undertaken in the US. 
The short-termist view provides that substantial weight is placed on current profits, leading to 
companies being managed according to these same short-term horizons, through transmission 
mechanisms from market to boardroom. This paper analyses whether short-termism in listed 
companies should affect corporate lawmaking in the UK. It examines market behaviour and 
the legal landscape, and the extent to which they dissuade or stimulate the corporate search for 
instant gratification. This paper assesses hostile takeovers, executive remuneration and 
shareholder activism as potential transmission mechanisms for short-termism. It finds that the 
first two are particularly effective mechanisms, while the third is circumscribed by the costs of 
collective action and rational apathy. The conclusion is that short-termism in listed companies 
should affect regulatory and legislative proposals in the UK. Breaking transmission 
mechanisms is crucial to prevent short-termism in corporate decision-making. Regulatory 
proposals are therefore suggested, endorsing Main’s Career Shares and reform of the 
composition of remuneration committees. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The markets are ‘now all about speed.’ 1  While high-frequency trading has dominated 
headlines, a short-term focus is perceived to pervade every aspect of the market. Illustrating 
this, the average duration that equity is held in the UK has fallen from around five years in the 
1960s, to seven and a half months in 2007, and to about eight months in 2010.2 Although there 
is no precise definition,3 short-termism may be described as the ‘excessive focus’ of executive 
directors,4 asset managers, investors, and analysts on immediate results, and ‘a lack of attention 
                                               
* LLM Corporate and Securities Law (London School of Economics and Political Science); BCL International 
(University College Cork). The author is grateful to Professor David Kershaw for guidance provided during the 
writing of the dissertation on which this article is based, and to this journal's editors for their valuable comments.  
1 Michael Lewis, ‘The Wolf Hunters of Wall Street: An Adaptation From “Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt,” by 
Michael Lewis’ NYT Magazine (New York, 31 March 2014) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/magazine/flash-boys-michael-lewis.html?_r=0> accessed 23 January 
2016. 
2 Andrew Haldane, ‘Patience and Finance’ (Speech at Oxford China Business Forum, Beijing, 2 September 2010) 
16 <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2010/speech445.pdf> accessed 
23 January 2016; Paul Woolley, ‘Why are Financial Markets So Inefficient and Exploitative - and a Suggested 
Remedy’ in Adair Turner and others (eds.) The Future of Finance: The LSE Report (London School of Economics 
and Political Science 2010) 133. 
3 Claire L Marston and Barrie M Craven, ‘A Survey of Corporate Perceptions of Short-Termism Among Analysts 
and Fund Managers’ (1998) 4 Eur J Fin 233, 234. 
4 References to executives, directors, and managers all concern executive members of the decision-making body 
of listed companies in the UK. 
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to the strategy, fundamentals, and conventional approaches to long-term value creation.’5 It has 
been characterised as a propensity to under-invest in product development and employee 
expertise, and as hyperactive behaviour by directors whose corporate strategy focuses on 
restructuring at the expense of sustainable growth.6 The core short-termist argument posits that 
securities traders hold their stock for short periods, during which they seek strong corporate 
results so they can sell profitably.7 This search is facilitated by the relative simplicity and 
accessibility of quarterly earnings or interim management reports.8 As a result of this short-
term orientation, too much weight is placed on current profits, and this causes companies to be 
managed according to the same short-term horizons as their investors.9 
Despite the media attention lavished on short-termism,10 it remains poorly understood. 
There is no consensus on its status as a problem worthy of intervention by corporate lawmakers. 
T Boone Pickens took a sceptical view of short-termism in the 1980s11 and more recently 
Professor Mark Roe concluded that debilities in the standard short-termist view render it 
untenable and unworthy of consideration by the legislature.12 Conversely, several institutes 
posit that short-termism can undermine the market’s credibility and lead to value-destruction.13 
Other commentators find themselves between the two aforementioned views, considering 
short-termism to be ‘more narrowly focused and of lesser importance than its supporters 
claim.’14 
                                               
5 CFA Center For Financial Integrity and Business Roundtable Institute For Corporate Ethics, ‘Breaking The 
Short-Term Cycle: Discussion and Recommendations on How Corporate Leaders, Asset Managers, Investors and 
Analysts Can Refocus on Long-Term Value’ (2006) 3 
<http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2006.n1.4194> accessed 17 August 2016. 
6 John Kay, ‘The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making’ Final Report (BIS 2012) 
10. 
7 Mark Roe, ‘Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom’ (2013) 68 Business Lawyer 
977, 981, 985; Alfred Rappaport, ‘The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession’ (2005) 61(3) Fin. 
Analyst J 65, 66. 
8 For academic modelling see Jeremy C Stein, ‘Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic 
Corporate Behavior,’ (1989) 104 Q J Economics 655. 
9 Roe (n 7) 985-986. 
10 John Chapman, ‘Time to Tackle UK Short-Termism’ Financial Times (London, 27 May 2012); Bill George 
‘Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, Not Long-Term Value’ New York Times (New York, 26 August 2013); Roger 
L Martin, ‘Yes, Short-Termism Really is a Problem’ Harvard Business Review (8 October 2015); Joe Nocera, 
‘What is Business Waiting for?’ New York Times (New York, 16 August 2011) A21; Mark J Roe, ‘The Imaginary 
Problem of Corporate Short-Termism’ Wall Street Journal (New York, 17 August 2015); Judith Samuelson and 
Lynn Stout, ‘Are Executives Paid Too Much?’ Wall Street Journal (New York, 26 February 2009) A13; James 
Surowiecki, ‘The Short-Termism Myth’ The New Yorker (New York, 24 August 2015). 
11 T. Boone Pickens, ‘Professions of a short-termer’ (1986) 64(3) Harvard Bus Rev 75, 76 where it was said 
‘[i]ncreasing acceptance of the short-term theory has freed executives to scorn any shareholders they choose to 
identify as short-termers.’ 
12Roe (n 7) 981. 
13 Aspen Institute Business and Society Program, ‘Overcoming Short-termism: A call for a more responsible 
approach to investment and business management’ (2009) 2; CFA (n 5) 3. 
14 Marston and Craven (n 3) 234. 
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Although short-termism has had an undeniable grip on the corporate legal 
imagination,15 it has not benefited from a sustained examination from the UK perspective. This 
paper examines behaviour in UK financial markets, the corporate legal landscape in which the 
markets function, and the extent to which they dissuade or stimulate the corporate search for 
instant gratification.16 It looks at whether the available evidence is reflective of a harmful short 
term focus, which requires action by legislators and regulators. For the short-termist argument 
to have traction, trading structures require a ‘transmission mechanism’ into a company to affect 
corporate time horizons, as otherwise directors could be ‘free to decide on corporate 
investments and time horizons.’ 17  Roe considered hostile takeovers as a transmission 
mechanism in the 1980s and that, currently, shareholder activism and executive remuneration 
could fulfil this role.18 Each of these transmission mechanisms will be examined from a UK 
perspective. 
This paper also analyses whether perceptions of short-termism alone can lead to 
managerial myopia,19 where managers take actions to increase current earnings at the expense 
of long-term value, by virtue of their belief that short-termism afflicts the market. Turning to 
potential regulatory responses, the argument in favour of increasing board autonomy will be 
scrutinised and other regulatory recommendations will be briefly addressed. The author, in 
rejecting Roe’s assertion that short-termism should not affect corporate law making, 20 
concludes that there are effective mechanisms transmitting short-termism in the market to 
corporate decision-making to render the issue worthy of legislative and regulatory attention. 
 
B. SHORT-TERMISM FROM LEGAL AND EVIDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 
1. The Corporate Legal Landscape 
Shareholders dominate UK company law.21 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 provides 
that a director must act in a way he considers ‘most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole.’ The ‘preferable analysis’ is that it requires 
directors to have regard to the long-term interests of shareholders and, in doing so, directors 
                                               
15 ibid 979. Professor Mark Roe performed such an examination from the US’ perspective in The Business Lawyer. 
Roe’s analysis and terminology will be utilised throughout. 
16 Kay Review (n 6) 14. 
17 ibid 
18 ibid 
19 Istemi Demirag, ‘Boards of Directors’ short-term perceptions and evidence of managerial short-termism in the 
UK’ (1998) 4(3) Eur J of Finance 195. 
20 Roe (n 7) 978. 
21 Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy (Hart Publishing 2011) 63. 
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may ‘take account of other stakeholder groups […] to determine what best ensures the long-
term growth of the company.’ 22  This is known as the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ 
approach.23 While UK company law is tempered by this requirement to have regard to other 
constituencies, it is still dominated by shareholder primacy. Maximising profit for shareholders 
is the most fundamental interpretation of benefiting the members of the company as a whole. 
UK takeover regulation developed separately to the regulation of the securities markets24 and 
corporate law. Representatives of merchant banks, institutional investors and the London Stock 
Exchange prepared the first set of rules, the Notes of Amalgamation of British Businesses, in 
1959.25  Consequently, the focus was not on securing the position of directors, but rather 
safeguarding shareholder interests.26 The first City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code) 
superseded the Notes in 1968, and the self-regulatory regime is still very much in evidence in 
the UK. ‘[T]he City of London prided itself upon being a village community, […] which could 
regulate itself by pressure of professional opinion.’27 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the 
Panel) administers the Code, is primarily staffed by secondments from City firms,28 and is 
‘untrammeled by the procedural and precedential niceties of the courtroom.’29 The influence 
of shareholder-friendly groups in the development of the system30 resulted in a prohibition on 
board frustration of bids.31  
As a result, UK law facilitates the City of London’s operations, and shareholders are 
the dominant force in both UK corporate law and UK takeover regulation. In UK corporate 
law, although directors may look to other stakeholder interests, their decisions must benefit the 
shareholders as a whole. UK takeover regulation also preserves shareholder interests and, 
unlike in the US, no action may be taken by a board to halt a takeover bid without 
contemporaneous shareholder approval. The powerful position of shareholders impacts upon 
the analysis in this paper and circumscribes what reform can realistically be achieved. 
                                               
22 ibid. 
23 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic 
Framework (DTI 1999) 37. 
24 Gullifer and Payne (n 21) 568. 
25 Issuing Houses Association, Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses (1959). 
26 Gullifer and Payne (n 21) 568; John Armour and David Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, 
and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown L J 1727, 1730. 
27 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin, [1987] QB 815, 835. 
28 Andrew Johnston, The City Takeover Code (OUP 1980), 127. 
29 Armour and Skeel (n 26) 1728. 
30 ibid 1730, 1764-76. 
31 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ‘The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers’ (11th edn 2013) Rule 21. 
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2. Evidence of Short-Termism 
a) Testing for Short-Termism 
The significant difficulty in testing for short-termism is illustrated in the dialogue between 
Miles, and Satchell and Damant in the 1990s. Miles’ findings prompted him to ask detractors 
of the short-termist argument why ‘longer-term cash flows appear to be discounted at much 
higher rates than shorter-term flows.’ 32  As Miles’ results were based on analysing 477 
companies that reported annually from 1977 to 1990, Satchell and Damant suggested a 
survivorship bias afflicted Miles’ study. 33  Survivorship bias is the tendency for failed 
companies to be excluded from studies, causing distorted results, as only companies successful 
enough to survive until the end of the period are included. Therefore, the market may not be 
undervaluing future cash flows but risk-discounting them for the possibility of company failure. 
As it was ‘not obvious how one could achieve’34 a satisfactory test, Satchell and Damant did 
not suggest an alternative. Similarly, Demirag posited it is ‘probably impossible’35 to evidence 
the existence of short-termism. 
Nonetheless, it is often observed that markets underestimate long-term corporate cash 
flows. 36  Directors regularly lament shareholder pressure to produce consistent short-term 
results. 37  A recent review of the UK equity markets concluded that short-termism is a 
problem, 38  identifying the principal causes as the decline of trust and misalignment of 
incentives throughout the investment chain. Similarly, Sir Roger Carr, former Chairman of 
Cadbury plc, attributed short-termism to a change in corporate ownership profiles and fund 
management performance pressures, which focus on immediate gains rather than long-term 
wealth creation. 39  Without a clear, accepted test for short-termism or agreement on the 
principal causes, this paper examines market characteristics such as decreasing holding periods, 
and the knowledge and nature of investors, to see if the market displays or favours short-
termism.  
                                               
32 David Miles, ‘Testing for short-termism in the UK stock market’ (1993) 103(421) Economic J 1379, 1394. 
33 Stephen E Satchell and David C Damant, ‘Testing for short-termism in the UK stock market: a comment’ (1995) 
105(428) Economic J 1218, 1218. 
34 ibid 1223. 
35 Istemi Demirag, ‘Assessing short-term perceptions of group finance directors of UK companies’ (1995) 27 
British Accounting Rev 247, 277. 
36 Angela Black and Patricia Fraser, ‘Stock Market Short-Termism – An Internal Perspective’ (2002) 12 J of 
Multinational Financial Management 135; Roe (n 9) 986. 
37 Roe (n 9) 987; John Graham and others, ‘The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting’ (2005) 
40 J of Accounting and Economics 3; Marston (n 3) 236. 
38 Kay Review (n 6) 9. 
39 Roger Carr, Speech to Said Business School, (Oxford, 9 February 2010) 2 
 <http://www.efinancialnews.com/share/media/downloads/2010/02/1056530392.pdf> accessed 23 January 2016. 
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b) Decreasing Holding Periods 
Short-termism may be observed in the shortening of investment horizons over the last two 
decades.40 The average holding period in professionally managed funds is less than a year.41 In 
2010, turnover on the major equity exchanges was running at 150 percent per annum of 
aggregate market capitalisation which implies average holding periods of eight months:42 a 
decrease from around five years in the 1960s.43 The increase in derivatives trading, the majority 
of which mature in less than a year, is also symptomatic of shortening horizons.44 On the 
significance of holding periods, Professor Alfred Rappaport posits: 
[t]he shorter the holding period, the more the beliefs of others rather than long-term 
fundamentals become central to investment decisions. High turnover thus sets the stage 
for short-term earnings-based decision making or momentum-motivated trading.45  
Momentum-based strategies and investment on the basis of estimated future earning 
and dividends have been compared to the hare and the tortoise. 46 The hare has ‘bursts of 
success’ while the ‘tortoise plods steadily on concentrating on real value and wins the race in 
the end.’47 Momentum trading and resulting distortions are seen as ‘part and parcel’48 of the 
trend towards increasing short-termism and high trading volumes, with emphasis being put on 
short-term price changes.  
A commonly stated justification for increased trading is raising liquidity. However, in 
an imperfect market,49 this increased ability to buy and sell may come at a cost, potentially 
bringing increased volatility and short-termism with it. Costs associated with increased trading 
for long-term investors include active management fees and associated trading costs, which 
can erode the value of funds. 50 Further, there is scepticism whether the liquidity benefits 
claimed would exist in the periods of acute market uncertainty when they might be required.51 
Hence, the main advantage identified with a higher turnover of shares in companies may not 
                                               
40 Woolley (n 2) 133.  
41 Rappaport, (n 7) 66. 
42 Woolley (n 2) 133. 
43 Haldane (n 2) 16. 
44 Woolley (n 2) 133. 
45 Rappaport (n 7) 65-66. 
46 Woolley (n 2) 136. 
47 ibid 137. 
48 ibid 133. 
49 Kay Review (n 6) 26, 35, 39; Financial Services Authority, ‘The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the 
Global Banking Crisis’ (FSA 2009) 40-42. 
50 Woolley (n 2) 134; CFA (n 5)11. 
51 Kay Review (n 6) 38. 
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even persist in the situations where it would be needed most, highlighting the problematic 
nature of increased trading. 
Shortening horizons cannot be addressed without mentioning high-frequency trading 
(HFT).52 The ‘lexicon of financial markets is dominated by talk of […] [HFT]. It is not just 
talk.’53 In HFT, time horizons are measured in fractions of a second, with activities conducted 
by computers using programmed algorithms, since the speed required is far beyond the capacity 
of human beings.54 From 2005 to 2011, HFT increased from a tiny proportion to over 35 
percent of the European equity market.55 In the UK, about two thirds of share turnover is 
accounted for by hedge funds and high-frequency traders.56  
HFT is not in itself evidence of ‘damaging short-term behaviour in the decisions that 
matter to the British economy.’57 It is too fast to impact upon the thought processes or strategy 
of market participants and too speedy to transmit short-term incentives to management. HFT 
is not either in itself a major contributor to short-termist behaviour but an aspect of a broader 
trend favouring trading over trust relationships.58 Roe acknowledges that decreases in holding 
periods, otherwise known as a high churn rate,59 would not render short-termism a problem 
requiring legislative or regulatory remedy unless a transmission mechanism brings these 
decreased trading horizons within management’s considerations in the corporate decision-
making process.60  
c) Knowledge and Nature of Investors 
This section assesses whether the knowledge and nature of investors constitute market 
characteristics from which short-termism may be observed. Shareholders focus on short-term 
financial accounts when they lack the knowledge to distinguish between losses arising from 
long-term expenditure and managerial incompetence. Turning to the nature of investors, where 
                                               
52High-frequency trading is a type of computerised trading using complex, proprietary algorithms to execute 
orders at very high speeds based on market conditions. 
53 Andrew Haldane, ‘The Race to Zero’ Speech at International Economic Association Sixteenth World Congress 
(Beijing, 8 July 2011) 4 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2011/speech509.pdf> accessed 23 January 
2016. 
54 Kay Review (n 6) 14. 
55 Andrew Haldane (n 53) 4. 
56 House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, ‘The Kay Review Submissions (Version 3, 26 
March 2013),’ 14 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmbis/writev/kay/kay.pdf> accessed 17 August 
2016. 
57 Kay Review (n 6) 14. 
58 ibid 39. 
59 In this context, churn rate refers to the percentage of shareholders who dispose of their shares within a given 
time period. 
60 Roe (n 9) 999. 
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an intermediary such as a fund manager manages shareholdings, the fund managers’ concerns 
are transferred to the market. If these concerns relate to their own short-term relative 
performance, there will be increasing attention on market trends rather than on long-term value 
creation. 
It is difficult for shareholders to deduce whether a company is making sound long-term 
investments, which may lead to short-term losses, or if short-term losses are caused by 
managerial incompetence. 61  This informational asymmetry between shareholders and 
managers may lead to shareholder reliance on current results, as it is easy to see whether the 
stock price went up on any particular day.62 To an extent, this lack of investor knowledge binds 
investor confidence to the next set of financial results, leading to demands to increase share 
price and placing pressure on the board to do so. 
The nature of shareholders also plays a role, where a change in ownership profiles in 
the UK has consisted of increased fragmentation. Historically, institutional investors occupied 
a high proportion of the UK equity markets.63 In 2012 pension funds and insurance companies 
held only 10.9 percent,64 with non-UK holders accounting for over 50 percent,65 and individual 
shareholders holding 10.7 percent.66 Thus, shareholders who in the past may have engaged 
with each other and then approached the board asking for an explanation for certain losses, are 
discouraged from doing so as a result of the dispersion of shares among non-UK holders and 
individual shareholders. These issues are known as collective action problems.67 
The prevalence of intermediation68 is another aspect of the nature of investors relevant 
for evidencing short-termism. Intermediation has led to a decline of the role of individual 
shareholders,69 with asset managers now considered the ‘dominant players in the investment 
chain.’70 Thus, asset managers’ considerations and concerns contribute to market behaviour. 
                                               
61 Samuelson and Stout (n 10) A13. 
62 ibid. 
63 Armour and Skeel (n 26) 1766. 
64 Office for National Statistics, ‘Ownership of UK Quoted Shares 2012’ Statistical Bulletin (2013) 1. 
65 ibid 12. 
66 ibid 18. 
67 David Kershaw, Company Law in Context (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 175. ‘Collective action’ refers to the behavior 
of a group working to achieve a common goal. As shareholdings are increasingly dispersed, and shareholders are 
separated in terms of location with non-UK holders accounting for a majority of the UK equity market, the 
likelihood of groups of shareholders forming to reach a goal is unlikely as the costs of such activity would be 
likely to outweigh any potential result. 
68 In this context, intermediation refers to a situation where third parties act as a middleman between investors and 
companies, such as mutual fund managers who actively manage capital pooled by investors and make decisions 
about which shares to purchase on the investors’ behalf. 
69 Kay Review (n 6) 30. 
70 ibid 11. 
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Critical time horizons for asset managers are the timescale within which an asset manager’s 
performance is judged (the performance horizon) and the speed at which the prices of shares 
revert to their fundamental value (the value discovery horizon). The shorter the performance 
horizon is relative to the value discovery horizon, the greater the incentive for managers to 
focus on the behaviour of other market participants rather than fundamental value,71 ie the 
higher the likelihood of short-termism. 
The design of asset managers’ contracts also influences their behaviour and 
management of investors’ funds, with fee structures based on short-term performance that 
encourage short horizons and momentum trading.72 Before hiring asset managers, investors 
review their ‘performance relative to index benchmarks or […] relative to other asset 
managers.’73 Consequently, the concern of asset managers is short-term relative performance 
and this triggers a ‘vicious circle’74 of increasing attention to market trends and diminishing 
attention to fundamental value, in other words, short-termism. This concern for short-term 
performance was recently illustrated by the behaviour of US funds reducing their exposure in 
UK markets amid fears the UK would vote to leave the EU.75 Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s 
Global Fund Manager Survey published in May 2016 concluded that the Brexit vote was seen 
as the biggest ‘tail risk’ facing fund managers and stated that UK equity allocation had plunged 
to its lowest level since 2008.76 Therefore, a short-term focus can present itself as a result of 
the knowledge and nature of investors. 
3. Conceptual and Factual Issues with the Short-Termist Argument 
Roe identified substantial conceptual and factual debilities afflicting the short-termist 
argument, which may justify the view that courts and corporate lawmakers should be reluctant 
in allowing short-termism to join the considerations that go into lawmaking.77 Certain select 
debilities will be assessed from a UK perspective, to consider if they offset the evidence in 
favour of increasing short-termism, altering the weight that ought to be afforded to the 
argument in policy discussions. 
                                               
71 ibid 40. 
72 Woolley (n 2) 133. 
73 Kay Review (n 6) 40. 
74 ibid. 
75 David Oakley, Stephen Foley and Michael Pooler, ‘US funds cut exposure to UK equities amid Brexit fears’ 
Financial Times (London, June 21 2016). 
76 Michael Hartnett, Brian Leung CFA, ‘Global Fund Manager Survey – if you go down to the woods today…,’ 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 17 May 2016. 
77 Roe (n 7) 979-981. 
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a) The UK Economy 
Several features of the UK economy may incentivise or facilitate long-term profitability, 
thereby counterbalancing short-termism to the extent that short-termism ought not to be a 
consideration for corporate lawmakers. This section assesses whether the presence of venture 
capital markets and private equity markets sufficiently mitigates short-term tendencies in the 
public market, such that short-termism is not a systemic issue and, therefore, should not be 
remedied by the legislature as though it is. Even if these features are insufficient to negate the 
corresponding short-termist features of the market, such as decreasing holding periods or the 
behaviour of funds managers, they provide alternatives to public ownership that could result in 
short-termism being problematic for certain companies, but not necessarily for the economy as 
a whole.78  
The presence of venture capital markets, private equity markets and privately held firms 
may serve to mitigate short-term tendencies in the public market, meaning short-termism is not 
a systemic issue. Private equity encompasses a number of different types of transactions, but 
has come to be most closely associated with buy outs,79 where private equity firms buy majority 
control of an existing or mature firm, or a publicly owned company which is then taken private. 
Private equity holders tend to ‘reorient its business model towards the longer term.’80 The usual 
hold period by a private equity fund is three to five years.81 If a company is overly focused on 
short-term financial results, therefore, marketplace incentives would be to move the firm into 
private equity’s hands, where the horizons are longer.82 Though private equity is far from 
perfect, the presence of alternatives highlights that there are offsets to short-termism, 
overlooked in many analyses. However, the presence of venture capital markets and private 
equity markets is not sufficient to counter all negative consequences of short-termism and does 
not alter the weight that should be afforded to the short-termist argument in policy discussions. 
b) Long-Termism in the Markets 
The short-termist view neglects the possibility that excessive value can be attributed to certain 
sectors and companies, such that the markets sometimes seem to be excessively long-term in 
their horizons. Market ‘bubbles’ illustrate this stock market long-termism, where excessive, 
intermittent high valuations are accorded to one sector or another of the financial market.83 The 
                                               
78 ibid 993. 
79 Gullifer and Payne (n 21) 654-655. 
80 Roe (n 7) 988. 
81 Gullifer and Payne (n 21) 686. 
82 ibid. 
83 Roe (n 7) 995. 
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millennium opened with the technology stock bubble that caused large-scale misallocation of 
capital.84 Technology stocks received an initial boost from fanciful expectations of future 
profits from scientific advances,85 funds invested in unglamorous ‘value’ sectors languished, 
prompting investors to switch funds to the newly successful growth managers, and value 
managers themselves began switching from value to growth to retain their jobs. 86  ‘Once 
momentum becomes embedded in markets, agents then logically respond by adopting 
strategies that are likely to reinforce the trends.’87 
In such instances, the market is giving excessive weight to the long-term as companies 
are accorded high valuations, without having demonstrated abilities in the immediate term to 
generate profits. Overvaluation is indicative of an unrealistic belief that the share price can 
continue to rise indefinitely or for a long period. While this demonstrates that both excessive 
short and long-term behaviour can be found in the markets, excessive long-termism is limited 
to certain sectors, in which a lack of evidence of profit-making abilities is excused for whatever 
reason. In contrast, short-termism pervades the market generally, as evidenced in market 
characteristics such as decreasing holding periods, knowledge of investors, and nature of 
investors. As a result, the relatively rare market occurrence of something like the technology 
stock ‘bubble’ does not alter the weight that should be afforded to the short-termist argument 
in corporate law-making debates. 
c) Short-Termism within Companies 
Capital markets are just ‘one piece of the jigsaw’88 and corporate law or regulations facilitating 
the transmission of any short-termism present in the market into the boardroom must be 
assessed. Mechanisms and structures within a company are important sources of short-term 
distortions.89 These include fee structures and tenure, which have their origins in managerial 
labour markets, not stock markets.90 Companies can design longer-term remuneration contracts 
to mitigate any short-term features they see as potentially harmful. 91  By examining 
transmission mechanisms, the extent to which short-termism is endogenous to the company 
                                               
84 Woolley (n 2) 121. 
85 Eli Ofek and Matthew Richardson, ‘Dot.Com Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices’ (2003) 58(3) 
J of Finance 1113. 
86 Woolley (n 2) 126. 
87 ibid. 
88 House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee (n 56) 16. 
89 Roe (n 7) 980. 
90 Tim Campbell and Anthony Marino, ‘Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets’ (1994) 
35 Intl Econ Rev 855, 858. 
91 Roe (n 7) 998. 
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will be clearer. Each of the three transmission mechanisms considered by Roe – hostile 
takeovers, shareholder activism, and executive remuneration92 – will be analysed. 
 
C. TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS FROM MARKET TO BOARDROOM 
1. Takeovers 
a) The Market for Corporate Control 
The market for corporate control93 sees hostile takeovers as a key mechanism for aligning 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders, with the threat of a takeover pressurising the 
board to generate profit.94 One premise of the market for corporate control is that there is ‘a 
high positive correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of 
shares of that company.’95 If the managers’ behaviour lowers the price of a company’s shares, 
market participants will identify an opportunity to take over the company for less than it would 
be worth under superior management.96 
Where there is a wide separation between share ownership and control, directors may 
engage in opportunistic behaviour.97 This includes attempts to extract private benefits from the 
company or shirking duties98 and leads to agency costs.99 The ‘crescendo’ of the distinction 
between the corporate entity and its shareholders is reached in the context of a takeover.100 The 
distinction, combined with a free market, means ownership can change over the management’s 
head.101 Therefore, in order to avoid issues of short-termism, boards must keep shareholders 
with increasingly short holding periods satisfied, ie unwilling to sell their shares to a predator. 
Unsurprisingly, managerial focus will be on maintaining and maximising share price. Yet, 
companies seek to maximise current earning at the expense of sound balance sheets, capital 
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investment, research and development (R&D), and job growth.102 Martin Lipton offered short-
termism as a reason why hostile takeovers needed to be stopped, asserting the issue as 
‘[w]hether the long-term interests of the nation’s corporate system and economy should be 
jeopardized in order to benefit speculators interested […] only in a quick profit […]?’103 
b) Prohibition of Takeover Defences 
The extent to which hostile takeovers may align the interests of shareholders and managers is 
determined by the legal and regulatory landscape, particularly whether executives can employ 
defences such as poison pills, 104  without shareholder approval. The Code prohibits 
‘management from employing any defensive tactics that would have the effect of frustrating 
an actual or anticipated bid’105 unless there is contemporaneous shareholder approval. Hence, 
UK boards cannot, as is prevalent in the US, prevent a takeover and preserve their jobs by 
putting a specially designed shareholder rights plan in place to render the company’s shares 
less attractive to potential acquirers, unless the shareholders themselves have approved this 
action. 
In the UK, the target board issues an opinion on an offer made to buy up a company’s 
shares.106 The Code does not limit the factors the board may take into account, nor does it 
require the board to consider the offer price as the determining factor in their opinion. 107 
However, boards’ opinions are likely to pivot on the financial terms of the offer. AstraZeneca’s 
recent board rejection is an example of this, stating ‘the financial and other terms […] are 
inadequate, [and] substantially undervalue AstraZeneca.’108 The Code and UK corporate law 
are therefore ‘clear manifestation[s] of the […] philosophy that boards ha[ve] a duty to 
prioritise the short-term financial interests of shareholders.’109 
                                               
102  Martin Lipton, ‘Empiricism and Experience; Activism and Short-Termism; the Real World of Business’ 
(Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 28 October 2013) 
<https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/28/empiricism-and-experience-activism-and-short-termism-the-
real-world-of-business/> accessed 23 January 2016. 
103 Martin Lipton, ‘Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom’ (1979) 35 Business Lawyer 101, 104; Roe (n 9) 
979. 
104 A ‘poison pill’ refers to a shareholder rights plan used to prevent hostile takeovers, by causing company shares 
to become unattractive to potential acquirers. For example, one kind of poison pill permits shareholders except 
for the acquirer to buy additional shares at a discount, hence increasing the number of shares the acquirer will 
have to buy. 
105 Armour and Skeel (n 26) 1728; Code (n 31) Rule 21. 
106 Code (n 31) Rule 25.2. 
107 ibid Rule 25.2, Note 1. 
108AstraZeneca, ‘AstraZeneca Board rejects Pfizer proposal’ (2 May 2014) 
<http://www.astrazeneca.com/Media/Press-releases/Article/20140502--astrazeneca-board-rejects-pfizer-
proposal> accessed 23 January 2016. 
109 Simon Deakin, ‘The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13 Corp Governance: An Intl Rev 
11, 14. 
Contextualising Short-Termism: Does the Corporate Legal Landscape Facilitate Managerial 
Myopia? 
298 
In recent years, concern has increased about the vulnerability of UK companies to 
takeovers. The UK is ‘one of a few major economies in which the hostile bid is free to flourish,’ 
with the company’s fate left ‘in the hands of the shareholders,’ a group which may change 
throughout the course of a bid.110 For instance, public opprobrium followed Kraft’s unsolicited 
acquisition of Cadbury in 2010, with Sir Roger Carr complaining that the protracted takeover 
battle led to short-term investors replacing long-term institutional investors. He ultimately 
concluded it was too easy to take over UK companies.111 
The Panel responded to this concern112 by amending the Code in 2011113 to increase 
protection against protracted ‘virtual bid’ periods, where a potential offeror announces that it 
is considering making an offer but does not commit to doing so.114 A further amendment 
improved the quality of disclosure of the offeror’s intentions regarding the target and its 
employees,115 though the generality of many disclosures disappointed the Code Committee.116 
These amendments lead potential bidders to be more circumspect when approaching potential 
targets, but rather than solving the problem, they delay it for a six month period.117 This does 
not enable directors to take a long-term approach. The company is still vulnerable to share price 
volatility associated with the bid, as well as offers from other predators during these six months. 
Therefore, hostile takeovers are capable of influencing the time horizon for decision-making, 
tilting it towards the short-term. 
If holding periods are decreasing, investors’ focus is on securing a high share price for 
sale, without concern for the long-term prospects of the company. Executives of companies 
recently targeted or ‘perceived to be susceptible,’118 sense that predators and the market do not 
share their assessment of their skills and long-term value of the company.119 The resulting 
pressure induces managerial myopia, whereby executives focus on achieving and maintaining 
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a high share price in the short-term to deter predators.120 This is because executives rationally 
fear takeovers as they ‘threaten their security, jobs, and perquisites.’121 
In the UK, therefore, hostile takeovers can still act as transmission mechanisms, as 
board frustration of bids without shareholder approval is prohibited.122 This leads to short-term 
behaviour by boards wishing to avoid being seen as potential targets. Executives’ concern for 
retaining their position would be present without stock market short-termism, but the 
shortening of investment horizons intensifies pressure on executives and transmits short-
termism within the corporate decision-making body. The risk of takeovers is clearly an 
effective transmission mechanism of short-termism to the board.  
2. Shareholder Activism  
Shareholder activism refers to a range of actions taken by shareholder to influence corporate 
management and boards. 123  Shareholder activists are often viewed as investors who are 
dissatisfied with some aspect of a company’s management or operations, and try ‘to change the 
status quo through “voice,” without a change in control of the firm.’124 Actions range from 
threatening the sale of shares (‘exit’), to asking questions at shareholder meetings and using 
corporate voting rights (‘voice’). 125  This is referred to as the ‘market for corporate 
influence.’126 
Shareholder activism has proliferated in recent years, with activist shareholders 
occupying the thoughts ‘and sometimes the nightmares’127 of executives. In the US, activism 
has been described as the epitome of ‘short-termism as an investment style,’128 with inherently 
negative consequences.129 Consequently, activism is perceived as a transmission mechanism, 
with investors using their ‘voice’ to express their wish for short-term returns, pressurising 
managers to restructure the company for short-term gains in share price. This section assesses 
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whether this activism promotes a short-term agenda such as an increase in price through 
financial engineering, thus transmitting short-termism of investors into corporate decision-
making and governance.  
a) Mechanisms for Activism 
UK legislation provides mechanisms for relatively small groups of shareholders130 to require 
companies to present shareholder resolutions to a meeting. The articles of association cannot 
deprive shareholders of this. 131  Shareholders also enjoy ‘a non-waivable right to remove 
directors mid-term without cause.’ 132  Statements of best practice such as the Corporate 
Governance Code and Stewardship Code promote shareholder engagement, though the efficacy 
of the latter has been called into question.133 Despite these facilitators, shareholder engagement 
is seen as an encumbrance and a cost.134 This lack of incentive for shareholders is unsurprising 
taking into account the market landscape, with a competitive fund management industry and 
increased fragmentation. 135  Widely dispersed shareholding make reaching the 5 percent 
threshold to call a meeting and passing a proposed ordinary resolution difficult. Shareholders 
would need to ‘join forces […] to have a group that is powerful enough to effect change.’136 
Costs incurred, referred to as ‘costs of collective action,’ lead investors to be rationally 
apathetic, hoping that someone else will make the effort.137 Therefore, as a practical matter, 
‘exit’ is favoured over ‘voice.’ 
b) The Efficacy of Activism 
Investors theoretically have incentive and influence to engage in activism that ensures directors 
operate in the interests of shareholders, providing a driver of ‘good’ corporate governance that 
leads to efficiency gains and improvement in performance.138 Nonetheless, empirical studies 
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on activism indicated little or no effect.139 In practice, actions are difficult to coordinate and 
even completed actions are not impactful. 
The efficacy of activism varies dramatically depending on its form, type of investor and 
the nature of proposals.140 No significant impact was felt on short-term performance following 
remuneration demands, whereas abnormal short-term returns followed demands relating to 
board composition.141 Though these studies were completed before the ‘shareholder spring,’142 
they cast doubt on activism’s status as a transmission mechanism, as activists’ motivations 
cannot be identified. Interventions for corporate governance purposes, or failed attempts to 
make short-term gains, are indistinguishable. Further, they highlight the coordination costs 
involved in orchestrating an action. 
While it is recognised there is a need for more long-term focus from investors, this 
should not result in automatic condemnation of activist strategies that create shareholder value 
in the short term. Only when strategies destroy more value in the long term should they be 
subject to criticism and one must accept the unpredictability of business decisions, recognising 
the fine line between a bad decision and a good decision turned bad. Shareholder ‘voice’ is not 
inherently good or bad for a company’s prospects, contrary to its portrayal in academic 
commentary. 
Therefore, activism is not considered an effective transmission mechanism in the UK. 
The market for corporate influence is arguably more developed in the US, ‘helped by federal 
securities and state corporate laws that have greatly inhibited the market for corporate 
control.’143 In the UK, the market for corporate control is far more effective as a spectre 
prompting directors to act myopically, with the market for corporate influence playing a lesser 
role due to its relative rarity, costs of collective action,144 and associated rational apathy. 
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Specific, intensive research is required to reach more than a provisional conclusion on UK 
activism, as most studies in this area relate to practice in the US. 
3. Executive Remuneration  
The structure of executive remuneration may lead to management replicating the time horizons 
of the market. If these are short-term oriented, executive remuneration may trigger the 
transmission of short-termism within the company. Executive remuneration is comprised of a 
base salary plus both short-term and long-term performance-related elements.145 The short-
term element, normally an annual bonus, will often include both corporate and individual 
performance targets. The longer-term elements might include a share option scheme or another 
form of long-term incentive plan, often using restricted shares. 146  Remuneration ‘should 
incentivise the manager to do his utmost to use his skills and experience to maximise the value 
that can be generated from the company’s resources and not to use his power and those 
resources in ways that benefit himself.’147 Linking payment to financial results was seen as a 
remedy for the perceived agency problem between shareholders and executives.148 
Executive remuneration could be seen as a transmission mechanism as pay is 
conditioned on, and often delivered as, equity. Therefore, one can expect directors’ decisions 
will take account of expected impact on share price. When remuneration is based on stock 
market returns, Roe states that management will tend to replicate the time horizons of the 
market. 149  This proves problematic if the market has short-term tendencies. This section 
assesses the formulation of executive remuneration and whether it encourages managerial 
myopia. It looks at who sets executive remuneration, the reason for high levels of remuneration, 
and the development of executive remuneration schemes in recent years. 
a) The Remuneration Committee 
The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance recommended 
the operation of a remuneration committee consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive 
directors to oversee the process of setting pay. 150  This served as the impetus for further 
transformations in the process, 151  which has culminated in the Remuneration Committee 
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consisting of two or three independent non-executive directors and the chairman, if he was 
independent upon appointment.152  The remuneration committee finds itself trapped in an 
institutional isomorphism of practice153 whereby the practice of other companies becomes a 
guide to what should be done in their company. Increases in disclosure allow remuneration 
committees to look around to see what other committees are doing.154 They often err on the 
side of generosity155 therefore, as they do not want to risk the disruption and expense that would 
ensue if their frugality led to executive turnover, demoralisation or distraction.156 
b) Share Options and the Use of ‘Long Term Incentive Plans’ 
Reform has occurred in the structure of executive remuneration in an attempt to align it more 
closely with the long-term performance of the company. Previously, the granting of share 
options signalled a revolution in how executives were paid. Options linked payment to financial 
results, incentivising the executive ‘to work at 100 [percent] of his capacity.’ 157  The 
identification of the senior managerial class with the goal of share price maximisation became 
‘ever more complete.’158 Stock options fell into disfavour however, as managers were free to 
exercise them when stock prices increased but could sit tight when they decreased. 159 
Therefore, directors were not negatively impacted if their strategies were unsuccessful in the 
long run. Greenbury160 encouraged a move away from options and toward other long-term 
incentive plans (LTIPs). The implosion of the ‘dot com bubble’ added momentum to this drive 
towards performance share plans.161 The typical remuneration schemes then in use, particularly 
stock options, became viewed as ‘rewards for failure.’162  
Tying share performance to reward is appealing given the information asymmetry and 
confounding factors that beset any analysis of ‘true’ executive value addition.163 However, 
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executives whose shares are overvalued have an incentive to defend that unrealistic price, 
which can lead to fraudulent behaviour. Remuneration based in any way on share price 
exacerbates this.164 Ideal pay incentives reflect both upside potential and downside risk. The 
incentive that most closely aligns the interests of executives and shareholders is management 
holding shares. Yet, since the effects of important investment decisions are felt over longer 
time horizons than executive tenures, ‘shares should be held up to or beyond the date at which 
the executive leaves office.’165 
These considerations led to the increased use of LTIPs and by 2005, the use of 
performance share plans in the FTSE 100 was at 84 percent.166 A commonly used performance 
measure for LTIPs is total shareholder return.167 This measures return to investors over a fixed 
(commonly three-year) period and compares it to returns from comparable companies, or an 
index.168 If a company earns lower than the median, the LTIP shares will not vest and any 
vesting is in proportion to the company’s position on a ranking, with full vesting for upper 
quartile performance.169 Despite these innovations and their accompanying adoption, doubts 
remain on the investor side over whether, for instance, three-year mechanisms are sufficiently 
long term to incentivise directors to focus on long-term value creation rather than short-term 
increases in share price. Meanwhile, managers may protest that total shareholder return is not 
truly reflective of executive behaviour as companies are ‘at the mercy of market sentiment, 
particularly if it benchmarks against an index […] and is in an out-of-favour sector.’170 This 
could be perceived as an instance where the dissatisfaction of both sides signals a fair 
compromise, albeit one that this author believes should be struck further in investors’ favour, 
as will be discussed in the Regulatory Recommendations section of this paper. 
c) A Flashpoint for Shareholder Concerns 
In 2012, the ‘shareholder spring’ resulted in investors expressing their disapproval regarding 
executive pay in the exercise of their corporate rights, resulting in the dismissal of several 
CEOs.171 A year later, legislation requiring a binding shareholder vote on proposed director 
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pay was enacted.172 The addition of a binding vote does not neutralise the possible effect of 
executive remuneration as a transmission mechanism. It retains the status quo, leaving 
remuneration committees to create remuneration schemes shareholders will approve of, hence 
rewarding directors for maximising shareholder value within these voting investors time 
horizons. The result is that it mimics any short-termism present in the markets. Currently, 
therefore, executive remuneration may be seen as transmitting short-termism and the addition 
of a binding vote on remuneration is unlikely to have a substantial impact on this fact.173 The 
preferred approach would be to target the way in which long-term incentives are delivered so 
as to ensure that they are genuinely long term, and deter myopic behaviour by managers.174 
4. Managerial perceptions of short-termism 
Professor John Kay ‘excoriated public company short-termism and sought means to reduce that 
short-termism.’175 The Aspen Institute posited ‘short-term thinking had become endemic in 
business and investment, and it posed a grave threat to the US economy.’176 The ‘motif’177 is 
that a short-term focus ‘has systematically robbed the economy of the patient capital it needs 
to produce sustained and vigorous economic growth.’ 178  Investors, asset managers and 
executives are seen as focused on short-term and the general view is that executives ignoring 
this find themselves ‘kicked to the street by impatient investors.’179 
However, let us assume shareholders take a long-term view but are not perceived to do 
so by managers.180 If the argument that short-termism exists in the UK market is unconvincing, 
managerial perceptions of short-termism become significant. Behavioural biases play a role in 
encouraging short-termism.181 By analysing questionnaire responses of boards of directors of 
over 200 listed companies, research conducted over 15 years ago concluded that if managers 
perceive the market will evaluate the company using short-term criteria, they will behave 
myopically. 182  Stein argues that even where capital markets are efficient, ie even when 
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managers know they cannot systematically ‘fool’ the market, managers will be acting 
myopically.183 Referring to the prisoners’ dilemma, he advocates that all parties, in this case 
managers, try to cheat because they believe other managers are doing the same.184 
For perceptions to induce short-termism, management’s investment horizon would 
have to be shorter than that of the average shareholder or they would have to misread the 
market’s preferences, for example by overestimating the extent or intensity of shareholder 
short-termism. Given the motif of short-termism as a systemic issue, possible overestimation 
of the intensity of short-termism by directors is not that far-fetched a proposition. These studies 
demonstrate the value of perceptions as a theoretical construct 185  in exploring short-term 
behaviour in companies. Perceptions of short-termism may be sufficient to transmit short-
termism to the corporate decision-making body whether or not short-termism actually exists in 
the market. 
 
D. THE SHORT-TERMIST ARGUMENT AS PROXY FOR MANAGERIALISM 
Managerialism is the belief in or reliance on the use of professional managers in directing a 
company. This ideology favours greater deference to the board of directors and less 
interference from shareholders generally. Its adherents have not been slow to seize on the 
increasingly fashionable issue of short-termism as further evidence that management knows 
best and shareholders are often a malign influence on decision-making. The managerialist 
analysis of short-termism posits that shareholders harbour short-termist tendencies due to their 
financial self-interest, whereas managers are more naturally aligned with sustainable company 
growth and long-term value creation. 
However, an established body of opinion shaped contemporary views on the roles of 
management and shareholders, with Berle arguing that corporations are only accountable to 
their shareholders.186 This shareholder-centric approach has not gone unchallenged though, and 
recasting shareholders as only one of several types of stakeholder in a company naturally 
demands that their dominance be curtailed and management assume a role of increased 
importance and independence from shareholder demands. Thus, some of the concerns 
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expressed regarding short-termism may be seen to be exploiting a topical concern to arrive at 
a predetermined policy outcome. 
Insulation of the board from the shareholders, rather than reforming and detoxifying the 
feedback mechanisms between them, is the prescription for which managerialists reflexively 
reach. Thus, takeover protection is a prominent policy prescription ‘induced by those who see 
stock market induced short-termism as a serious problem.’187 Martin Lipton attacked financial 
market short-termism by proposing the empowerment of managers to defeat hostile takeovers 
in the US in his seminal 1979 article ‘Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom.’188 Takeover 
regulation took a very different form in the UK, where this justification did not result in 
empowerment. ‘Diametrically opposed choices’ were therefore made by the two 
jurisdictions.189  
In the managerialist camp, Bainbridge has endorsed director primacy,190 Blair and Stout 
espoused the ‘team production’ model, which conceives of the board as a mediating hierarch,191 
and Elhauge argued that managers must have ‘discretion to sacrifice profits in the public 
interest.’192 As a treatment for short-termism, proponents of greater board autonomy claim it 
fosters long-term sensible behaviour. These arguments pivot on the assertion that shareholders 
are best served by managers with discretion and autonomy. Shareholders are perceived as being 
poorly informed, prone to disagreements on corporate strategy and disruptive to the board if 
given too much authority to affect decision-making directly. 193  With greater insulation, 
management are granted the opportunity to take a long-term view of company’s commercial 
needs rather than being pressured to adopt a short-term strategy to maximise shareholder 
value.194 
However, there is an element of opportunism in how managerialists have attached 
themselves to the current corporate governance debate on short-termism to advance a view that 
predates it. In the UK, greater board autonomy could enable the board to protect the company 
from takeovers. Zhao, Chen, Zhang, and Davis state that this reduces managerial pressure to 
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resort to short-term behaviour,195 but generally, it does not appear the insulation of boards leads 
to higher R&D as one would expect if this argument is correct.196 Therefore, there is scant 
evidence to indicate that increasing board autonomy leads to long-term investment and 
development, as managerialists claim. Short-termism should not be used as a proxy for 
managerialism;197 the managerial approach is not bolstered by reliance on short-termism and 
any call for greater board autonomy must stand or fall on its own merits.198 
 
E. REGULATORY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the earlier sections have identified, there are transmission mechanisms in UK company law 
and takeover regulation that lead to short-term tendencies in the market and affect the 
management of companies. As a consequence, managers focus on short-term results to avoid 
the company becoming a takeover target, to earn higher compensation, and to prevent their 
removal from the board. Thus, the recommendations proposed are aimed at corporate 
governance reform. These are in line with this ministerial statement of Stephen Byers, then 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry: 
The key to shaping the market in ways that achieve our twin objectives of efficiency 
and social justice lie in the framework of rules within which companies do business and 
make a profit. So company law and corporate governance are at the heart of our debate 
about the kind of society we want and the nature of our economy.199 
It is accepted that regulation is a ‘negative approach based on restrictions’200 which 
market participants will attempt to circumvent, and ‘no single reform will provide the 
solution.’201 Regulation, though imperfect, is, however, necessary. Breaking the transmission 
mechanism from market to corporate decision-making bodies, or perhaps more accurately, 
from perceptions to decisions, is essential to lessen the adverse effects of short-termism and 
restrict its inroad into boardroom decision-making. Further realignment of incentives and 
encouraging effective engagement between shareholders and executives could loosen short-
                                               
195 Zhao and others (n 120). 
196 Ravi Jain and Sonia Wasan ‘Adoption of Antitakeover Legislation and R&D Expenditure’ (2009) 6 Investment 
Management and Fin Innovations 63; Mark Johnson and Ramesh Rao ‘The Impact of Antitakeover Amendments 
on Corporate Financial Performance’ (1997) 32 Fin R 659. 
197 Roe (n 7) 1003. 
198 ibid 1004. 
199  Stephen Byers, Speech to TUC/IPPR seminar on corporate governance (London 7 June 2000) 
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20010301100355/http://dti.gov.uk/ministers/speeches/byers070600.htm
l> accessed 23 January 2016. 
200 Woolley (n 2) 123. 
201 Kay Review (n 6) 9. 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
309 
termism’s grip. The following recommendations focus on the transmission mechanisms 
identified earlier as effective: takeovers, shareholder activism, and executive remuneration. 
1. Takeovers 
Without a change to the Code, takeovers will continue to act as a transmission mechanism. 
Removing the non-frustration principle contained in Rule 21 would enable ex ante shareholder 
authorisation of certain defensive actions.202 The possibility of change is acknowledged, but 
UK and EU corporate law limit the availability of takeover defences that ‘provide management 
with considerable discretion to resist if not unequivocally prohibit a bid.’203 Removal of Rule 
21 would remove a prohibition of shareholders’ contractual expression,204 but with ‘trivial 
impact on activity levels in the market for corporate control.’205 If approval is not readily given, 
short-termist views will still be transmitted into corporate decision-making. Hostile takeovers 
are seen as a transmission mechanism, and an obvious solution does not present itself.  
2. Shareholder Activism 
Currently, shareholder activism is not perceived to be acting as a transmission mechanism. 
There are many championing the rights of shareholders to utilise their ‘voice’ in corporate 
governance matters, with the Kay Review emphasising the importance of the quality of 
engagement by investors and promoting a broadening of the existing concept of stewardship.206 
A key test for stewardship will be the impact of increasing shareholder power over 
remuneration since 2013,207 as it is feared fragmentation of shareholding will prevent this 
making a real tangible impact. 
Further, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 gives shareholders a legally 
binding vote on future pay policy once every three years, backed by an advisory (ie non-
binding) annual shareholder vote. Thus, although shareholders voted against the almost £14m 
remuneration package for BP chief executive Bob Dudley, this vote was non-binding as 2016 
was a year where such shareholder votes were advisory. Mr Dudley’s remuneration was not 
changed.208 
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While Theresa May has recently stated there should be a binding vote on executive 
remuneration,209 this paper recommends that a cautious approach must be taken if reform is 
proposed on shareholder activism. Shareholders exhibit biases and any recommendation 
encouraging a stronger shareholder ‘voice’ must be tempered by the recognition that this could 
enable activism to become a transmission mechanism for short-termism. This possibility must 
be afforded due consideration, recognising that ‘[s]hareholder engagement is neither good nor 
bad in itself: it is the character and quality of that engagement that matters.’210 
3. Executive Remuneration  
The issue with executive remuneration is not that directors are paid too much, but that they are 
‘paid too much for doing the wrong things.’211 Current arrangements encourage a ‘heads I win, 
tails you lose’ perspective on decision-making.212 The structure of remuneration should be 
altered to promote long-term value and reward directors for achieving this. To do this, Main 
proposes ‘Career Shares.’213 Career Shares would require the director to retain the shares 
concerned until the end of a period following exit from the company. Commentators have 
recommended three, 214  four 215  and ten 216  years as potential retention periods. As final 
remuneration would depend on how the company is performing years after the director’s exit, 
strategies put in place during their tenure need to continue to deliver. The reasoning behind 
Career Shares is that ‘[m]anagers with longer horizons will […] be less likely to engage in 
imprudent […] strategies or short-term earnings manipulation when the ability to exit before 
the problem comes to light is greatly diminished.’217 
Potential trade-offs associated with this recommendation include a higher turnover of 
executives or early departure if they believe the share price has peaked, to capture some of the 
value.218 Though labour mobility at this level is often overstated, this possibility cannot be 
ruled out.219 The executive’s successor must also continue to perform well or the reward will 
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decrease. A period of five years is suggested, as it may strike a balance by incentivising a long-
term focus without rendering the director at the mercy of their successor’s achievements. When 
evaluating these trade-offs, one must bear in mind that LTIPs, Career Shares, and similar 
schemes represent only a portion of director’s pay. 220  Therefore, it seems unlikely the 
recommendation will have a drastic impact on executive turnover. On balance, it is argued 
Career Shares encourage long-term thinking without rendering executive positions financially 
unappealing.221  
The composition of the remuneration committee also merits examination. If non-
executive members of the committee are executive directors of other companies and will 
indirectly benefit from an increased market standard, 222  this may lead to increasing 
remuneration. Preventing these members from holding the position of committee chair could 
alleviate undue pressure to increase remuneration. 223  To reward directors properly on 
performance increasing long-term value, Career Shares remedy the short-term aspect of 
performance-based remuneration. In addition, neutrality of the remuneration committee, at 
least for the position of chair, will prevent excessive generosity as a result of isomorphism of 
practice combined with indirect self-interest. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
The short-termist argument recognises the importance of maximising long-term value and, 
from an economic perspective, the argument incorporates market imperfections and the reality 
that we have to strive for efficiency. It values patience, perseverance, and faith in future 
rewards,224 and therefore it came as no surprise that the argument caught the imagination of the 
corporate legal world and has become a common feature in media and academic commentary. 
This paper has examined short-termism from a UK perspective, finding evidence of short-
termism in market characteristics like decreasing holding periods, the knowledge and nature of 
investors. The available evidence is reflective of a harmful short-term focus, which would 
benefit from action by legislators and regulators. After analysing the perceived weaknesses of 
the short-termist argument, including arguments that shortening of the average holding period 
is due to HFT, and that the market displays excessive long-termism, this author finds that these 
are not sufficiently convincing to alter that conclusion. Further, this paper considers that 
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perceptions of short-termism alone can lead to managerial myopia. Managers might take 
actions to increase current earnings at the expense of long-term growth, due to a belief that 
short-termism pervades the market.  
In a letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, Warren Buffett wrote, ‘when we own 
portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favourite holding 
period is forever.’ 225  This serves as a reminder that effective engagement between 
managements and investors can lead to long-term success. However, if mechanisms transmit a 
short-term focus from the market to the corporate decision-making body, executives are not 
focused on the long-term: they are behaving myopically. The consequences of short-termism 
in the market are determined by the corporate legal and regulatory landscape. After examining 
the impact of hostile takeovers, shareholder activism and executive remuneration, the primary 
conclusion of this paper is that short-termism in public firms is something that should affect 
regulatory and legislative proposals in the UK. There are sufficient mechanisms transmitting 
short-termism present in the markets to corporate decision-making to render the phenomenon 
worthy of regulatory attention. In particular, hostile takeovers and executive remuneration are 
particularly effective transmission mechanisms, with shareholder activism’s impact 
circumscribed by the costs of collective action and rational apathy. 
The regulatory proposals contained in this paper demonstrate a path reform should take, 
including an endorsement of Main’s Career Shares and reform of the composition of 
remuneration committees. Breaking the transmission mechanism is key to preventing short-
termism creeping its way further into corporate decision-making. As the transmission 
mechanisms are multi-faceted, reforms involving many stakeholders are necessary. This paper 
therefore offers solutions to combat managerial myopia and re-focus executive attention to 
long-term value creation. 
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